Ghost Security Audit Report — 2026-04-29

ByL.B. Kaelin

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Ghost Security Audit: Slack + OpenClaw Config Hardening Needed


Ghost Security Audit: Slack + OpenClaw Config Hardening Needed

On 29 April 2026, an automated security audit of a production OpenClaw instance (version 2026.4.14) hosted at 46.62.191.46 revealed six critical configuration findings. All findings are hardening opportunities, not active compromises. The root cause is a Slack integration with an open group policy combined with full exec security, plus a world-readable config file. For AI operators running OpenClaw agents with Slack access, this audit shows exactly how a prompt injection could escalate to host-level command execution if left unhardened.

Key Context

The audit was performed by Scout, an OpenClaw-native security agent, on 29 April 2026 between 16:42 and 16:48 UTC. The target was a personal assistant deployment for a single operator (Ghost) running on an Ubuntu 24.04 LTS cloud container. The audit report was filed at commons/agents/scout/proactive/2026-04-29-security-audit-report.md. The operator requested the audit to validate the security posture of a long-running agent with Slack, file system, and exec tool access.

What Actually Happened

Audit scope and methodology

Scout performed a local scan covering: OpenClaw version and CVE status, gateway exposure, authentication mode, Slack integration policy, exec tool security, file permissions, environment variable exposure, network controls, and log anomaly review. The full checklist is documented in the OpenClaw audit tool.

Six critical findings

All six critical items are configuration hardening gaps. The most severe: Slack groupPolicy is set to “open” and tools.exec.security is set to “full”. This means any Slack user who can @-mention the agent bot can execute arbitrary shell commands on the host. The audit report states: “a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.”

The config file at /home/node/.openclaw/openclaw.json is world-readable (mode 644). It contains API tokens for Slack, Anthropic, DeepSeek, and Tavily, plus the gateway auth token. Any process on the same system can read them. The state directory /home/node/.openclaw/ is also world-readable (mode 755).

Three API keys (TAVILY_API_KEY, DEEPSEEK_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY) are exposed in environment variables. The gateway is loopback-only (127.0.0.1:18793), so external processes cannot reach /proc. The audit rates this as medium risk, acceptable for the current deployment model.

An update to version 2026.4.26 is available but contains no security-critical fixes beyond what is already patched. The host has no ufw/iptables firewall, but this is a cloud container where the hypervisor provides network isolation. Systemd is not installed, which is expected for a Docker container.

CVE posture

All known OpenClaw CVEs are patched in version 2026.4.14. This includes CVE-2026-32922 (CVSS 9.9, token rotation RCE, patched in 2026.3.11), CVE-2026-25253 / ClawBleed (CVSS 8.8, WebSocket hijack, patched in 2026.2.x), CVE-2026-35639 (CVSS 8.7, device.pair.approve privilege escalation, patched in 2026.4.5), and the April 9-10 batch of 13 CVEs (patched in 2026.4.5). The full list of 5+ NVD CVEs and 20+ GHSA advisories is confirmed patched.

Log anomalies

Log review from 20 April to 29 April 2026 shows zero auth failures, zero unauthorized access attempts, and zero indicators of compromise. There were 20+ benign EISDIR errors from Scout trying to read a directory path as a file, and several 403 errors from paywalled sites (CNBC, gbhackers.com). One self-healing heartbeat message failure occurred with no impact.

Why This Matters for AI Operators

Operational impact

If you run an OpenClaw agent with Slack integration and exec tools enabled, this audit is a direct blueprint for your own hardening. The combination of an open Slack policy and full exec security creates a prompt injection to RCE path. Any user in a monitored channel can become an attacker. The fix is straightforward: set tools.exec.security = "allowlist" to require explicit approval per command, or set channels.slack.groupPolicy = "allowlist" to restrict which channels the agent responds to.

The world-readable config file is a credential theft vector. If any other process on the same host is compromised, all API tokens are exposed. The fix is chmod 600 /home/node/.openclaw/openclaw.json and chmod 700 /home/node/.openclaw/.

Security implications for agents

The audit confirms that no active compromise occurred, but the configuration gaps are real. For operators running agents with file system access (tools.fs), the audit recommends setting tools.fs.workspaceOnly = true to limit access to the workspace directory. For higher isolation, agents.defaults.sandbox.mode = "all" provides container-level isolation for agent execution.

The ClawSec compliance suite is recommended for drift detection, SOUL.md integrity checks, and NVD advisory feeds. This is a medium-term action for teams that need continuous compliance monitoring.

Relevance to the OpenClaw community

This audit is a real-world example of the OpenClaw audit tool in action. The tool flags configuration issues that are common in single-operator deployments that grow into multi-channel integrations. The community can use this report as a hardening checklist. The findings are not unique to Ghost; any operator with Slack + exec tools faces the same risk profile.

Opposing/Tempering Perspective

Caveats and limitations

The six critical findings are all configuration hardening, not software vulnerabilities. The risk is real but depends on an attacker having access to a Slack channel the agent monitors. For a personal assistant deployed in a private workspace with a single operator, the attack surface is narrow. The audit itself notes that “this is a personal assistant for Ghost alone, not truly multi-user.”

The world-readable config file risk is mitigated if the host has no other untrusted processes. The environment variable exposure is acceptable because the gateway is loopback-only. The missing firewall is compensated by the cloud hypervisor. These mitigations reduce the severity but do not eliminate the need for hardening.

The update to 2026.4.26 is low priority because the 2026.4.8 batch already covers all known critical CVEs. The audit recommends updating anyway for good practice, but there is no urgency.

What benchmarks don’t tell you

This audit is not a benchmark of model performance or agent capability. It is a security posture assessment. The findings are about configuration, not about the intelligence of the agent. An agent can be highly capable and still insecure if the deployment is misconfigured.

Who disagrees and why

Some operators argue that an open Slack policy with exec security set to “full” is acceptable for single-user personal assistants in a trusted Slack workspace. They point out that adding allowlist restrictions creates friction for legitimate use. The counter-argument from the audit is that prompt injection can come from any message the agent processes, even in a trusted channel. A compromised Slack account or a malicious embedded link can trigger the same attack path.

The Bottom Line

Actionable takeaways

If you run an OpenClaw agent with Slack integration, apply these three fixes today. First, run chmod 600 /home/node/.openclaw/openclaw.json and chmod 700 /home/node/.openclaw/ to block local credential theft. Second, set tools.exec.security = "allowlist" to require explicit approval for each shell command. Third, set channels.slack.groupPolicy = "allowlist" with known channel IDs to restrict which rooms can trigger the agent.

Run openclaw update to move to version 2026.4.26 for general hygiene. Evaluate the ClawSec compliance suite for ongoing drift detection. Review your own log anomalies: the benign EISDIR errors and 403s in this audit are typical, but any auth failures or unexpected sessions should be investigated immediately.

Watch for the next OpenClaw release that may include a hardened default profile for Slack integrations. The community is likely to adopt the audit tool as a standard pre-deployment check. If you are building multi-agent systems, container-level sandboxing (agents.defaults.sandbox.mode = "all") should be your baseline.

Sources

Official

Coverage

Technical

Related Reading

Published 29 April 2026. All claims attributed to the Scout audit report and linked sources.



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